The Story of the Refinery Closure

The Story of the Refinery Closure

5 September 2026

Over the past few days, there has been a battle over the narrative surrounding the closure of the refinery. In that context, I heard a politician who was given the microphone to tell his version of events. It was an emotional and highly confused story. I can barely retell it.

His story boils down to a number of claims. The Netherlands wanted to close the refinery and used the PAR to achieve this. As evidence, he points to the Growth Strategy, which, according to him, explicitly stated that the refinery had to be closed. This supposedly reflected a long-standing Dutch ambition dating back to Shell’s departure. The idea, he claimed, had been to run seawater through the installations immediately after Shell left, thereby rendering them unusable.

According to him, it was thanks to the then Prime Minister that the refinery remained open, operated by Venezuela’s PDVSA. That contract expired in 2019. In his narrative, the PAR — read: the Netherlands — seized the opportunity to push through the closure. It was the PS and Ben Whiteman who genuinely tried to keep the refinery operating. And, according to him, the current government could also have achieved this if it had appointed its own people to RdK, now 2BAYS. That, more or less, was the story.

There are other narratives. Many likewise start from the premise that the PAR, or the coalition of which the PAR was part, closed the refinery. I find it incomprehensible that a storyteller with such a confused and barely substantiated narrative is simply handed a microphone. Even more remarkable is that his monologue was broadcast again the following day, thereby spreading the story even further.

But there is another narrative, one that, in my view, corresponds much more closely with the actual course of events. The contract with PDVSA expired by operation of law. The search for a new operator started relatively late. The government pursued two scenarios: one in which a new operator would be found, and another in which that effort would fail.

Outside the political arena, there was GreenTown, which saw greater potential in closing the refinery and developing a green economy. Many people, including trade unions and political parties, interpreted this as a decision to close the refinery. They simply could not understand that preparing for multiple scenarios is a normal part of responsible policymaking.

Despite these circumstances, an A-class operator, Motiva, was successfully attracted. However, the process became tainted by allegations of corruption. Motiva withdrew, and what followed was an agonizing search for B- and C-class operators willing to step in. The search for a partner itself became a business model and cost enormous amounts of money.

The political struggle was subsequently reduced to two camps: those who wanted to close the refinery and those who wanted to keep it operating. Admittedly, the U.S. sanctions also threw a major spanner in the works.

2BAYS Curaçao was officially established and launched on 7 October 2024. In effect, this amounted to an acknowledgment that the second scenario — development towards a green economy — was becoming reality.

Time has shown who had vision and who was right, and who reacted primarily out of emotion, with insufficient understanding of the changes taking place in the world. Even then, however, it remains true that, had the situation been handled better, the oil developments in Guyana and Suriname might still have offered an opportunity.

Miguel Goede