Curaçao, Suriname, and the Missing Link
October 25, 2024
Sometimes, you want to write a good blog, but you already feel it will drain your energy. Yet, here I am, writing anyway.
I have often written about the relationship between Willemstad and The Hague. It was again a topic in the Antilliaans Dagblad of October 23, 2024, focusing on parliamentarians from the Netherlands commenting that Curaçao is doing little to combat corruption in Curaçao and the ongoing debate about reparations for slavery. Some argue that there should have been no apologies and that there would have been no payments for restoration. But what we seldom discuss—me included—is the relationship between Willemstad and Paramaribo.
In recent years, Willemstad has increasingly shown interest in rekindling ties with its former fellow territory, Paramaribo, since the discovery of massive oil reserves akin to Guyana. Another article in the paper mentioned that the President of Suriname recently visited Curaçao. These two countries have known each other for hundreds of years, and for a long time, they were part of the same Dutch Kingdom. Yet, there has never been strong communication, let alone cooperation. If this indicates the future, we might conclude that little progress will be made.
Before I delve deeper, consider this: Suriname produces many vegetables and fish. Yet, we’ve never managed to get these products into Curaçaoan supermarkets regularly. The excuse is always the same—poor transportation links. But the truth lies deeper; there is mutual disdain between the two nations. Curaçaoans deeply contempt the mati (a slang term often used for Surinamese). They see the mati as cunning and untrustworthy. I have heard that this sentiment stems from the days when Surinamese workers employed at the refinery were often promoted over locals.
On the other hand, Surinamese envy Curaçao’s wealth, which they believe was achieved solely due to Dutch influence and the refinery. They criticize Curaçaoans for never having had the courage to seek independence. While Suriname struggled for self-rule, Curaçao remained tied to the Dutch, which has fueled a particular disdain.
Now, with Willemstad wanting to "dance" with Paramaribo, it is nothing more than opportunism, a fantasy to capitalize on Suriname's newfound "black gold." However, whether the Surinamese people will benefit from these oil riches remains to be seen. Suriname, like Curaçao, is an extractive society where the elite profit while the masses struggle. Both nations share this fundamental flaw, a consequence of their colonial past, which aligns perfectly with the analysis of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics winner, Why Nations Fail.
In conclusion, the idea of Willemstad and Paramaribo dancing together is bound to fail unless corruption and the extractive elites in both nations find common ground. The shared language of self-enrichment binds them, and if corruption continues unchecked, this dance of convenience might last longer than expected. It is unrealistic to think that suddenly good governance will become a strength of both these countries in the short term.
Miguel Goede
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